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Session I:  Keynote Panel, Describing the Legal Landscape* 
Steven Metalitz 
Thank you.  And thanks to June and her colleagues for inviting me; it’s great to 
be here this morning.  I just want to start off by mentioning I am a partner at Mitchell 
Silberberg & Knupp.  I’ve been counsel to the IIPA for many years, but what I’m 
going to be saying here are my views and not necessarily the positions of the IIPA.1  
So . . . I’ll beg your indulgence for a few slides here, and I’m just going to trot through 
the thirty years of experience that Probir summarized so well2 and then talk about 
what’s been accomplished by this linkage between copyright and trade agreements 
and what we might look forward to in the future. 
So this is the obligatory global map.  Actually I’ll have another one later, but this 
just shows who we currently have free trade agreements with that have copyright 
provisions in them.  I mean, it’s got most of them.  I think Singapore was too small 
to show up there, so don’t worry about that too much.  And I think it is important to 
imagine this overlaid with some other graphic that shows the WTO3 TRIPS 
Agreement,4 because obviously most of the major trading countries in the world are 
members of the WTO, subject to the TRIPS Agreement and that’s really the 
background, the basis for everything that’s come up since then in the FTAs.5  So . . . 
that’s one theme I’m going to return to—that these multilateral agreements are really 
the basis for our bilaterals.  It’s the launch pad, let’s say, for our bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements with regard to copyright. 
So I’ll just run quickly through kind of a three-phase categorization of these 
FTAs.6  The first phase was the ones that were entered into in the late 80s and early 
90s.  This is the period when the TRIPS Agreement was being negotiated—the 
Uruguay Round.  TRIPS didn’t actually come into force fully until ‘94.  So these are 
very much influenced by the Uruguay Round.  And of course you have the famous 
NAFTA agreement that you’ve heard so much about on the current presidential 
campaign as well as the Israel Agreement.7 
 
 * These remarks are a transcript of a talk that was given on October 14, 2016, at the Kernochan 
Center Annual Symposium at Columbia Law School.  
 1. About IIPA, IIPAWEBSITE.COM, https://perma.cc/8A4P-UKCM (“IIPA” refers to the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance). 
 2. Probir Mehta, Session I: Keynote Panel, Describing the Legal Landscape, 40 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 311 (2017). 
 3. About WTO, WTO.ORG, http://perma.cc/7FD4-6EVN. 
 4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
 5. IIPA, supra note 1 (“FTA” refers to Free Trade Agreement(s)). 
 6. See World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2011, at 51, http://perma.cc/9N7U-5RHP. 
 7. Id. at 52 (“NAFTA” refers to the North American Free Trade Agreement). 
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The second phase are those that entered into force in the first decade of this 
century.  That’s after TRIPS.  That’s after the WIPO Digital Treaties,8 which were 
negotiated in 1996.  And so it builds on—that’s the launch pad for the second wave 
of the FTAs.  Thirteen countries that are listed there.  And then the third phase is the 
most recent.  These all came into force in 2012, but actually the copyright 
negotiations were pretty much completed in about 2008.  There are other reasons that 
they were held up.  And as Korea, Colombia and Panama—I’ll be focusing here 
mostly on Korea, for reasons that will become clear. 
So, if you look back at the phase one FTAs, they brought in—and building on the 
TRIPS Agreement—they had some plus elements that went beyond TRIPS.  And 
I’ve listed here some of these, some plus features about encrypted satellite signals 
and other things that, again, are fairly commonplace today.  
The phase two of, again, what I’m saying, plus here, I’m kind of comparing phase 
two agreements with the phase one agreements.  And you can see quite a few plus 
elements here that are in these phase two agreements—it was a big step up in 
copyright protection and enforcement.  And some of these—such as extended term 
of protection—Probir has already mentioned, and not all of these are in all these 
agreements.  I would say that the provision on no compulsory license for Internet 
retransmission to broadcast—which is a very important provision—is drawn from 
the Australia agreement, primarily.  And then at the bottom I’ve got technological 
protection measures—access controls—which Probir also referred to.  So, again, 
we’re kind of building in—in more detail—some of the provisions of the WIPO 
digital treaties that had been negotiated shortly before these phase two agreements.  
Another important point is that the obligations in some of these agreements were 
for the countries to accede to the WIPO digital treaties—to bring in provisions that 
are consistent with the WIPO digital treaties.  The other important thing about these 
treaty agreements is that they provide an enforcement mechanism.  The WIPO digital 
treaties have a very minimal enforcement mechanism through the World Court.  But 
the FTA dispute settlement provisions—they vary somewhat, but they’re similar in 
all of these agreements, so there is a way, in theory, at least, to make sure that 
countries live up to these agreements. 
          And finally, this comparison to KORUS9 here:  What are the plus elements 
even beyond the phase two?  And I’ve listed a few here:  broader government 
mandate not to use infringing materials and not limited to software, provisions on 
retransmissions of lawfully encrypted signals (unauthorized cable and satellite 
signals), camcording, which I think has already been mentioned.  And then there 
were some in Korea’s case, some very important side letters—one on book piracy, 
one on online piracy that were part of the KORUS Agreement.10  
 
 8. WIPO Internet Treaties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 
http://perma.cc/RS38-UARD. 
 9. Chapter Eighteen Intellectual Property Rights, KOREA-US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
(KORUS), https://perma.cc/RW8H-SFQ4.  
 10. See Letter Between Hyun Chong Kim and The Honorable Susan C. Schwab (June 30, 2007), 
https://perma.cc/3VUQ-RKS4; Letter Between Hyun Chong Kim and The Honorable Susan C. Schwab, 
(June 30, 2007), https://perma.cc/ZS8X-6K5S (online piracy). 
STEVEN METALITZ, SESSION I:  KEYNOTE PANEL, DESCRIBING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 319 (2017)  
2017] KEYNOTE PANEL, DESCRIBING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 321 
So there are still many issues open with some of these trading partners that we 
signed agreements with ten or more years ago, and I think this afternoon we’ll 
probably hear more discussion about that.  I’ve just listed one from phase two, which 
is Chile, and one from phase three, which is Colombia.  Some issues haven’t yet been 
fully resolved with these countries, and implementation is certainly one important 
piece, and compliance is one important piece, of unfinished business here. 
So you’ve already heard all about the TPP.  This map—well, it’s still not sure 
whether we’ve got Singapore on there, but we’ve got pretty much everybody else.  
And this distinguishes between those as to which there already is a U.S. FTA in 
force—such as Canada and Mexico, from phase one, Australia from phase two and 
so forth—and those that don’t, such as, notably, Japan, Malaysia . . . . In Vietnam we 
actually do have an agreement in force that’s not a typical FTA—we have a bilateral 
trade agreement with them.11 
So, that’s the TPP environment.  Now what are the plus features that we find in 
the TPP?  There is some element here of continuing to strengthen, modernize, move 
forward, with copyright obligations and enforcement obligations.  And again, I want 
to say here—I’m talking about plus related to some of the phase three agreements.  
I’m not talking about plus related to the status quo—my little footnote there makes 
that clear, I hope.  Because, obviously, there’s a lot of pluses related to the status quo.  
A country like Malaysia, just to take one example, doesn’t have a lot of the phase 
two—hasn’t done a lot of the phase two requirements, like term extension and some 
of the others.  So, this isn’t plus related to the status quo.  It’s plus related to the most 
recent agreements.  And I’ve listed a few here, and a lot of them, interestingly, have 
to do with the enforcement side.  There’s a provision to make it clear that you can 
have criminal liability for major commercial scale copyright infringements.12  That’s 
a familiar test for TRIPS, but this fleshes it out a bit more and says, if you have a 
substantial prejudicial impact on the right-holder, even if no money changes hands—
that can attract criminal liability.13  There is a requirement that criminal liability 
include aiding and abetting—I think that’s a new provision.  Many countries may 
already have had it, but I think it’s a new explicit obligation.  And then there’s a 
digital enforcement obligation—basically says that all the enforcement mechanisms 
that are available in the analog environment need to be available in the digital 
environment as well.14  It’s section 18.71(2) if you’re scoring at home. 
And I put that in italics because we don’t quite know how significant this could 
be.  Potentially, it could be very significant.  But, again, it’s kind of an innovation—
we don’t find most of it in the previous FTAs.  And again—I’ll mention again that 
some of the obligations . . . . One plus in the TPP—although it’s also in some of the 
 
 11. US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, U.S.-Viet., Dec. 10, 2001, KAV 5968.  Agreement 
Between The United States of America and The Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade Relations, July 
13, 2000 (BTA), Chapter II on Intellectual Property Rights. 
 12. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement art. 18.77, Feb. 4, 2016. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at art. 18.71(2). 
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earlier agreements—is that obligations that derive from the WIPO digital treaties 
would be subject to the dispute settlement process.15   
So, this is continuing more of the plus features. 
Now we turn to something new.  We have some minus features in the TPP.  There 
are some areas where it falls short of what we achieved in the KORUS Agreement.  
That’s what I’m referring to really as the phase three.  And I’ve just listed a few of 
these here.  One is dealing with exceptions to these prohibitions on tampering with 
access controls with technological protection measures—as Probir mentioned, these 
are really key enabling technologies for digital delivery of copyright materials.  And 
all of the success that consumers around the world have been enjoying with more 
access to more works, in more ways, and in more media, at more price points than 
ever before, depend on protection of technological protection measures.16   
But there can be exceptions to those protections.  There are in U.S. law, there are 
in some of the prior agreements, but what’s in the TPP—it’s much broader, it’s more 
general, likely to be more liberal, and we’ll talk about that later.  And I mention the 
government use of infringing materials,17 that’s kind of coming back, only applying 
to software in the TPP.  And on the point of protection against cable signal theft, in 
the TPP, you can either have civil enforcement or criminal enforcement; you don’t 
have to have both.  So, some of these are maybe more important than others, but 
there are some minus features, I think, in TPP compared to the phase three agreement.  
So that’s our quick run through what’s been going on over the last thirty years, 
and I want to spend the rest of my time just talking a little bit about—stepping back 
and saying, “What have we accomplished?”  What has been accomplished through 
this linkage over the past thirty years, and what is the future of this linkage?  Now, 
just—again, to be clear—the fulcrum of this is the idea that countries that you’re 
negotiating with want access to the U.S. market, which is incredibly important for 
many countries for all kinds of goods and services.  And so that gives them an 
incentive to agree to improvements in their copyright regimes that they might not 
otherwise agree to.  That’s kind of the linkage that we’re talking about:  What has 
been the impact of that?  I think, if you step back and look at it—I think it’s been an 
incredible success over the past thirty years, and I say that in four dimensions. 
One has already been referred to—it’s obviously been a very big plus for the 
copyright industries here in the United States.  There [have] been some studies on 
this; the ITC did a study on trade agreements in general that the IIPA contributed 
some information to.   
One thing that we do with the IIPA every couple of years is commission a study 
on copyright industries in the U.S. economy; we’ve been doing this ever since about 
1990.18  And if you go back and look at that study, you can really see the growth in 
foreign sales and exports of U.S. copyright materials, has grown from about $27 
 
 15. See generally id. ch. 28. 
 16. Id. at art. 18.68. 
 17. Id. at art. 18.80. 
 18. See, e.g., STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2016 
REPORT (2016), http://perma.cc/VN9W-Z78P. 
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billion in 1989 to $156 billion in 2013.19  Even if you adjust for inflation, there has 
been a quadrupling of this, and this obviously has helped benefit the U.S. economy 
in many, many ways, and it really confirms the premise—the U.S. entered into this 
about thirty years ago—that stronger copyright protection and enforcement around 
the world is in the best national interest of the United States.  So that’s one dimension.  
But there’s others.  
I think it’s quite likely that this has been a very positive development for copyright 
industries within the domestic economies of our trading partners.  We like to say 
particularly if you think of the smaller economies—maybe not China, but if you think 
of a smaller economy:  Who is hurt most by rampant, unchecked piracy?  It’s very 
often the local creators, the local copyright industries and creative industries, 
because—particularly for reasons of language isolation, or cultural particularities—
that’s their market, and if that market is stolen from them by pirates, they have 
nothing.  Whereas in, you know, a United States producer, the United States sells 
copyright material in the world market.  And while obviously we want to be able to 
compete in all the markets around the world, if some market becomes closed due to 
piracy, well, there are a lot of other markets available—so it doesn’t have quite as 
much of a necessarily existential impact as it would on the local industries.  So the 
local industries have, I think, clearly benefited from having the improvements that 
have been driven by some of these FTAs.  
The third dimension, I think, is in the area of copyright law harmonization, and 
this—we obviously have the multilateral agreements, we have the WIPO treaties, but 
they’re at a very high level of generality and the FTAs get a little more granular.  And 
I’ve been spending a lot of time over the last several years in the environment of—
in the internet policy environment at the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers and other venues, and it’s really been driven home to me the extent to 
which we have a much higher level of harmonization of copyright law—and a way 
of dealing with abuses that take place online—than we do in almost any other area 
where there are online abuses—we don’t have anything like that level of 
harmonization or of international disciplines with malware, dealing with spam, 
dealing with even child protection.  Copyright really has become much more 
harmonized, and, obviously, it’s not unified, it’s not uniform, there are a lot of 
differences, but we do have a much higher level of harmonization.  And I think, 
again, the FTAs have driven that. 
The last dimension I would mention of success for this strategy—really, again, 
taking a broader view—is for globalization and for global consumers.  I think as I’ve 
mentioned, more people have more access to more works of U.S. and other creators 
put forward than ever before, and there are a lot of reasons for that, but I think the 
FTAs have contributed to it; there’s a much higher level of trade in works of 
authorship, in copyright materials.  Now if you don’t think trade is a good thing and 
globalization has a lot of positives, then you may not think this is a positive, but I 
happen to think this is one positive result that the FTAs have helped to contribute to.  
 
 19. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2016 REPORT 2 
(2016), http://perma.cc/F6MZ-BXQB. 
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So, that’s great—I think we’ve done quite well over the past thirty years.  I think 
the other side of the coin is that we may well have reached the high watermark of 
this linkage and the ability to use it to advance these goals.  That’s true both in terms 
of trade agreements and in terms of the normative, norm-setting process, for example, 
at WIPO.  It’s no secret that . . . the path to bring TPP to force is far from clear at this 
point.  And also, as I mentioned, the TPP Agreement is really the first in the series 
that we’ve talked about that actually does have some minuses.  I think it has many 
pluses, and those outweigh the minuses, but I think there are some areas in which 
TPP falls short.  And then as far as the normative agenda, I think—and I’m sure we’ll 
get into this later—I think it’s quite likely that the Marrakesh Treaty,20 the first one 
to recognize, to mandate exceptions to copyright protection, may well be the last 
treaty that WIPO is in a position to produce for quite a while.  So I think, again, we 
may be seeing some movement away from this high watermark. 
Why is this so?  Well, a couple of reasons are pretty obvious.  One is that—
compared to thirty years ago—there’s a very organized and well-funded opposition 
to expansion of copyright protection and enforcement.  It’s organized globally, it’s 
funded globally, and that’s an issue that has to be contended with that wasn’t there 
in the 1980s and 90s.  Second, of course, is the overall backlash against trade, and—
to the extent that trade agreements have been the vehicle for getting some of these 
positives accomplished—that vehicle is under intense bombardment now, not just in 
the United States but really in many countries—it’s no news here, that there’s a 
backlash against globalization and perceived downsides of free trade.  
And so those are kind of the obvious and big picture reasons.  I think we also have 
to be candid and say there [are] some other reasons that are a little bit closer to home.  
One is that, if you look at these phase two agreements—and some of the important 
provisions were extremely detailed and prescriptive, and it’s no wonder that 
countries might resist, not necessarily signing onto a concept, but signing on to a 
very detailed menu of how they had to implement that concept.  In some cases, this 
prescriptiveness was not due to the advocacy by copyright interests.  I think the fact 
that some of these agreements had very prescriptive provisions on ISP liability and 
notice of takedown was because the telcos—the carriers—insisted on bringing 
basically what was adopted in the DMCA21 in the United States into the agreements 
almost verbatim and would not budge from that position.  But there were probably 
areas, too, where copyright interests, copyright advocates, maybe needed to be more 
aware of the downside of some of these provisions—and I guess the best example of 
that is in TPMs, technological protection measures, where again, some of these 
agreements had very prescriptive limitations on what exceptions can be recognized.  
I think that’s actually—there’s a lot of good reasons for that—but it’s not surprising 
that some countries pushed back against that, and particularly in the context of a very 
complex multilateral—or plurilateral—negotiation that Probir was running for the 
 
 20. Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually 
Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, WIPO, https://perma.cc/K9LG-4HE3. 
 21. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
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last umpteen years, and which has been so successful overall in terms of the results 
in more areas that were just, sort of, a bridge too far. 
So I guess that the question is, if we are having to shift our focus, where is that 
focus going to shift to?  And I’ll just mention two points on that.  One I’ve already 
said is implementation.  There are many agreements that are enforced now but that 
really are not being implemented.  And no one—not the U.S. creators, not the 
creators in the other country, not those who have an interest in the harmonization of 
the law and globalization of the economy—we’re not getting those benefits yet.  So, 
I mentioned a couple of them:  the phase two, the Chile agreement; phase three, the 
Colombia agreement.  And I have to say on TPP what we’re looking at right now—
and it’s unfortunate that Suzie Frankel wasn’t able to join us, because New Zealand, 
which is the country that’s probably about farthest along in the process of considering 
implementing legislation for the TPP, has a proposal that is profoundly noncompliant 
with the TPP with regard to access to those technological protection measures.  So if 
that’s enacted in its current form, it would really set a terrible precedent, and we’ll 
just have to see how that plays out over the next few months.  
The other focus I would mention is that a lot of energy that has been devoted to 
intellectual property issues in the trade environment over the last thirty years has 
shifted to the e-commerce area—and this is a very important area for the copyright 
industries as well.  Increasingly, the products and services that the copyright 
industries provide are being disseminated through electronic commerce, so there’s a 
lot of talk about digital trade as a kind of moniker but not everyone agrees on what 
it actually covers—but I think it’s clear that the copyright industries are at the heart 
of digital trade and increasingly our copyright material is being traded in the e-
commerce environment.  So the TPP provisions here are very important milestones, 
but I think it’s the most ambitious set of international obligations in the e-commerce 
area.22  Very important. There are a lot of other areas where e-commerce issues are 
rising in prominence:  at the WTO, the Department of Commerce has created a digital 
attaché program which they now say they will be expanding;23 the International 
Trade Commission had a study on digital trade.24  So it could well be that we might 
see in the future a lot more focus on electronic commerce issues in future trade 
agreements, future negotiations at the WTO—and if it’s done right, it could have a 
very positive impact as well as for those who produce and depend upon creative 
products and services. 
Now, it may not actually work out that way for a variety of reasons, and I’ll just 
mention one.  As I mentioned before, the plurilateral and multilateral standards were 
kind of a launch pad for all of the things that were accomplished in the copyright 
trade linkage.  If you didn’t have the . . . well, starting with Berne, but if you didn’t 
have the WTO Agreement, and then later the WIPO Digital Treaties, I don’t think as 
much could have been accomplished.  Electronic commerce is an area where there’s 
 
 22. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement ch. 14, Feb. 4, 2016. 
 23. Penny Pritzker, Commerce Launches Digital Attaché Program to Address Trade Barriers, 
DEP’T OF COM. (Mar. 11, 2016, 1:45 PM), http://perma.cc/X55V-VNHH. 
 24. Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 2, Inv. No. 332-540, USITC Pub. 4485 
(Aug. 2014). 
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not as much existing international legal discipline.  So, in other words, there’s no 
floor beneath which most countries can’t sink.  Since most countries are in Berne and 
the WTO, it’s a disincentive for them to spurn those obligations, but there isn’t 
anything comparable in the electronic commerce area that I know of.  So that may 
be one limitation on e-commerce as the venue here.   
The other, of course, is that we have the copyright industries, they’re not the only 
party with a stake in electronic commerce—most perhaps identify with it, or 
sometimes an adversarial position vis-à-vis the copyright industries.  I think this is 
an area where we’re going to have a lot of interests that coincide or align, and at other 
times we’ll have to disagree or fight vehemently with some of our colleagues in the 
technology industries.  So it’ll be interesting to see how that plays out.   
I think the one thing that we can be sure of is—it was really very well summed up 
by our new Nobel Laureate, one of the great American creative artists, one of the 
crowns of our creative community, when he said many years ago—“the times, they 
are a changin.’”25 
 
 25. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ 
(Columbia 1964). 
